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Bank Financed Precious Metals Trading
- Is It Just Another Precious Metals
Scam?
I. Introduction
In recent years, a potentially enormous market has been devel-
oping in off-exchange commodity transactions.1 This growth is
mainly due to the intense competition within the financial commu-
nity for the development of more innovative investment instruments.'
The rapid expansion of "over-the-counter futures-type transactions"
has shaken up the industry and its federal regulator, the Commodi-
ties Future Trading Commission ("CFTC").4 Within the past year,
the CFTC has directed its Off-Exchange Task Force ("Task Force")
to study a number of areas related to transactions that exhibit some
of the economic and legal characteristics of commodity futures or
options transactions, and which are conducted outside of a CFTC
regulated exchange environment.5
1. Karr, Climb in Off-Exchange Futures Sales Challenges CFTC, Wall St. J., Mar. 3,
1987, at 10, col. 1 [hereinafter Karr]. Off-exchange commodity transactions are those that do
not take place on a regulated commodity exchange.
2. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and
Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599 (1986) [hereinafter Gilberg]. The author states
that
[i]n the last few years, "an endless stream of exotic financial instruments
conjured by Wall Street wizards" literally has taken the financial community by
storm, fundamentally altering market trading practices and pitting institutions
against each other in an intense competition for development. These products -
which include various types of "swaps," options, forward contracts, and price
guarantees - now are being offered to and traded by every major financial insti-
tution and multinational corporation in the world, as well as by governments and
individuals, and nothing indicates that the unprecedented growth of the markets
for such instruments is likely to subside any time soon. To the contrary, the
trend clearly is toward increased "product proliferation" and the addition of still
more arcane and complex trading vehicles to the already dizzying array now
available.
Id. at 1600 (quoting New Distortions in Financial Statements, DUN'S Bus. MONTH, June
1986, at 46).
3. The phrase, "over-the-counter futures-type transactions," refers to transactions that
involve futures-type instruments, which take place outside of the organized commodity ex-
changes. See generally REUTERS GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL
TERMS 158 (1982).
4. See Karr, supra note 1.
5. Letter from Marshall E. Hanbury, General Counsel, CFTC, and Paula Tosini, Direc-
tor, Division of Economic Analysis, CFTC, to Mike Clark, Vice President, Precious Metals
Programs, Wilmington Trust Company (Aug. 14, 1987) (requesting information from lenders
offering bank financing programs) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office) [hereinaf-
ter Hanbury Letter].
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One area under investigation by the Task Force and the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission's Advisory Committee on
CFTC-State Cooperation,6 concerns programs in which a lender fi-
nances the purchase of precious metals by a member of the general
public from a broker-dealer ("bank financing program"). Although
the number of banks offering such programs is relatively small, 8
these programs are becoming increasingly popular. State and federal
regulators are concerned over "the alarming number of boiler-room
operators9 and other scam artists [who] are exploiting this regulatory
'dead zone' by hard-selling unregulated off-exchange investment
products to the general public."1 On March 15, 1987, the Board of
Directors of the North American Securities Administrators Associa-
tion, Inc. ("NASAA") unanimously adopted a resolution11 which
urges the CFTC to reexamine its position, with regard to CFTC In-
terpretive Letter No. 85-212 which forecloses the possibility of CFTC
6. "The Advisory Committee was created by the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion for the purpose of receiving advice and recommendations on matters of joint concern to
the states and the Commission arising under the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended."
Meeting Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 35,753 (1987).
7. Clark, Bank Financing Your Precious Metals Purchase - Hybrid of the Outright
Cash Transaction and Leveraged Buy, Barron's Nat'l Bus. & Fin. Weekly, July 21, 1986, at I
[hereinafter Clark]. Bank financing programs generally facilitate the purchase of gold, silver,
platinum and palladium in bullion coins or commonly traded investment bars. See also Gil-
berg, supra note 2, at 1672; and CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2. [1984-1986 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) U22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985).
8. See Clark, supra note 7. At the time of this author's research, approximately nine
banks and two "non-bank banks" were offering such programs. See Transcript of Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Meeting on Off-Exchange Issues at 21-22 (June 9, 1987) (state-
ment by Dennis Klejna, Director of CFTC Division of Enforcement) (copy on file in the Dick-
inson Law Review office) [hereinafter Transcript].
9. The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) has previously reviewed
the nature of "boiler room" operations. REPORT BY THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON IN-
VESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, COMMODITY INVEST-
MENT FRAUD, S. REP. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-13 (1982) [hereinafter PSI REPORT].
The subcommittee described "boiler room" operations as follows:
In actuality these "firms" usually consist of rented rooms crammed with desks
and phones. Salesmen are hired for their brazen persistence alone; no actual
knowledge of commodities is necessary. In fact, the less a salesman knows about
a product the less restrictions are on him while speaking to customers. Conse-
quently, salesmen receive little training and even less supervision. Salesmen
learn to think of prospective customers as "mooches," holding money in their
pockets which should be in the salesmen's pockets. As a result, they often make
blatant oral misrepresentations and twist facts as they see fit, negating the im-
portance of written representations later sent to the investor.
Id. at 10-11.
10. Investor Alert Aug. 1987, at 2. The Investor Alert is a joint project of the North
American Securities Administrators Association and the Council of Better Business Bureaus to
regularly warn the public of current questionable investments.
II. NASAA Resolution on Commodity Futures Trading Commission Jurisdiction Over
Bank Funding Programs, 12 NASAA Rep. (CCH) 9311, at 9248 (Mar. 15, 1987) [hereinaf-
ter NASAA Resolution].
12. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
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jurisdiction over bank financing programs. State regulators are also
at a loss when dealing with these programs because few states have
the laws or enforcement staffs to regulate off-exchange commodity
trading."3
This Comment first will scrutinize the details of bank financing
programs in order to determine if a lender's involvement in these
transactions falls within the jurisdiction of any existing regulatory
law. In particular, it shall examine whether these transactions are
subject to the Commodities Exchange Act ("CEA")," CFTC Regu-
lations, the Model State Commodity Code,"5 the Securities Act of
1933, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Second, this Com-
ment will examine whether a bank financing program should be con-
sidered a futures contract,' forward contract, leverage contract," or
a security.' 8 This analysis will focus on the various roles played by
financial institutions in bank financing programs and on CFTC In-
terpretive Letter No. 85-2, which currently governs this area of the
law. Finally, this Comment will make recommendations regarding
Rep. (CCH) 22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985).
13. Scott, As Higher Gold Price Glitters, Swindlers Pan for the Unwary, Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Apr. 20, 1987, at 18, col. 2 [hereinafter Scott].
14. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982). The CEA imposes extensive registration requirements and
reporting obligations, as well as substantive prohibitions upon brokers and traders of commodi-
ties. Title 7, Section 2(a) of the United States Code grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to exchange traded futures contracts and certain option contracts. 7 U.S.C. § 2a
(1982 & Supp. I 1985). See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1602. The CFTC was created by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 101, 88 Stat.
1389 (1974). See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1601 n.3.
15. MODEL STATE COMMODITY CODE (North American Securities Administrators Asso-
ciation, Inc.), reprinted in [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 22,568 (Apr. 5,
1985) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. A summary provided in the Code states that
[tihe Model State Commodity Code, adopted by the North American Securities
Administrators Association, Inc., does not purport to prohibit or regulate those
commodity transactions preempted by the federal Commodity Exchange Act.
The Model Code seeks to complement the federal statutory scheme in three
ways. First, the Code excludes those commodity transactions and related activi-
ties exclusively regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Sec-
ond, the Code prohibits certain transactions such as off-exchange futures con-
tracts and activities such as unregistered commodity pool operations that are
also prohibited by the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC rules. Third,
the Code prohibits all other commodity transactions covered by the Act except
those offered or sold by certain persons licensed or supervised by the federal or
state governments or those specifically permitted under the terms of the Code.
Id. at 30,449. To date, only a few jurisdictions have adopted the Code in its entirety. Several
jurisdictions, however, are considering the adoption of the Code, in whole or in part.
16. For a discussion of what constitutes a "futures contract," see infra notes 98-126 and
accompanying text. This discussion also contains reference to "forward contracts" and their
explicit exemption from regulation under the CEA.
17. For a discussion of what constitutes a "leverage contract," see infra notes 127-49
and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of what constitutes a "security," see infra notes 174-213 and ac-
companying text.
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the future course of regulatory structure and will review various rec-
ommendations that have been proposed by industry leaders.1
II. Bank Financing Programs
Since the early 1980's, a limited number of commercial lenders
in the United States have been offering "precious metal financial ser-
vices to facilitate bullion purchases at the retail level."20 In its sim-
plest form, a bank financing program involves a bank loan to an indi-
vidual to purchase precious metals from a dealer.21 Typically, the
investor makes a minimum down payment of twenty to thirty per-
cent of the total purchase price to the dealer, and the dealer ar-
ranges for a bank to make a loan directly to the investor for the
balance.22 Most banks do not require financial statements to be filed
for a loan of less then $100,00028 because the loan is fully secured by
the value of the precious metals.
Once the bank executes the separate loan agreement with the
individual, the dealer is paid in full with the loan proceeds.24 This
generally is completed within two to seven days.' The dealer simul-
taneously makes delivery of the metal to the bank or a designated
depository, which holds the metal as collateral for the loan.26 A key
19. On October 8, 1987, the Advisory Committee on CFTC-State Cooperation con-
ducted a public meeting to discuss bank-financed precious metals programs. At this meeting,
various industry experts explained their views and made recommendations for or against regu-
lation of these programs.
20. Clark, supra note 7.
21. See id. Clark suggests that the combination of "leverage" and bullion ownership can
be rewarding. He explains that
[i]ncreasing one's buying power by borrowing money to make a larger or
more expensive purchase is what most of us do routinely when buying a car or
house. This practice, when applied to our investments, is known as "leverage" -
matching one's own capital with a (usually) much larger portion of borrowed
funds to increase the size of one's investment and, hopefully, one's return on that
investment. There exist, of course, a number of well-known vehicles which per-
mit us to leverage our precious metals investments - futures contracts, com-
modity options and buying mining shares on margin. However, a new service
offered by a limited number of U.S. banks combines the advantage of leverage
with the assurance and gratification of physical bullion ownership. This rela-
tively new but simple concept is now gaining wide recognition and acceptance
throughout the precious metals bullion retail market place.
Id. at 1.
22. When a dealer receives a customer order, it notifies the bank, which then sends the
customer the required loan documents. The borrower then must complete and return the docu-
ments to the bank within a specified time period. The dealer then purchases the metal from
someone else, usually a metal refiner or other dealer, and has it sent to the bank. See Investor
Alert, supra note 10; Clark, supra note 7.
23. Clark, supra note 7.
24. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 18.
25. Id.
26. See generally INDUSTRY COUNCIL FOR TANGIBLE ASSETS CONSUMER GUIDE TO Fi-
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feature of this transaction, however, is that the dealer directs the
bank to transfer ownership of and title to the metal to the individ-
ual. When this is completed, the individual receives a confirmation
from the broker and a notice from the bank that the metal has been
set aside for the individual. 8 It must be stressed that the investor
actually buys and owns physical bullion and not paper instruments
representing precious metals."
The bank maintains a lien on the metal until the loan is paid
and also receives a signed promissory note and security agreement
from the borrower.80 If the market value of the metal declines by a
sufficient amount, usually ten to twenty percent, the bank may de-
mand that the borrower pay-down 1 the loan balance, or deposit ad-
ditional collateral with the bank to restore the loan ratio to the origi-
nal seventy or eighty percent.3 2 If the market price of the metal
declines substantially and the borrower fails to make the requisite
pay-down, the bank may liquidate a portion of or all of the metal in
order to reduce the outstanding loan balance. 3 Conversely, if the
metal prices rise, then most banks will lend additional funds against
the owner's increased equity, either to purchase more metal or for
some other purpose. 4
The borrower can pay off the loan at any time without penalty
NANCING YOUR PRECIOUS METALS PURCHASE (1987) (initial draft submitted by Michael B.
Clark of Wilmington Trust Company) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office) [here-
inafter ICTA].
27. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 18.
28. This notice from the lender generally amounts to a "certificate of ownership" or title
to the metal. See Investor Alert, supra note 10; Transcript, supra note 8, at 18.
29. See Clark, supra note 7. This transaction does not involve a broker who merely
undertakes a "short" obligation to deliver the metal upon the customer's satisfaction of the
loan. Rather, the investor actually receives title to the metal in addition to being listed on the
broker's books as having purchased the metal. The broker actually purchases the metal and
does not hedge its commitment to the purchaser through transactions in exchange traded fu-
tures contracts. The broker, therefore, is not exposed to the risks of price fluctuations. Gilberg,
supra note 2, at 1673-74.
30. John Norris, Testimony Before the Advisory Committee on CFTC-State Coopera-
tion (Oct. 8, 1987) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office) [hereinafter Norris].
31. A "pay-down" is merely a payment demanded by the lender in order to reduce the
outstanding principal loan balance.
32. See Clark, supra note 7. Lenders typically avoid calling the transaction a "margin
call," which is a term usually reserved for commodity futures and securities transactions. A
"margin call" is a "request from a brokerage firm to a customer to bring margin deposits up to
original levels." CFTC, GLOSSARY OF TRADING TERMS 37 (1987). A "margin deposit" is an
amount of money or collateral deposited by a customer with his broker to insure the broker
against loss on open futures contracts. The "margin deposit" is not partial payment on a
purchase. Id. at 36.
33. See Investor Alert, supra note 10, at 3. See also Transcript, supra note 8, at 19;
Clark, supra note 7.
34. Clark, supra note 7.
93 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1988
and take delivery of the metal.36 Very few borrowers, however, ever
take physical delivery of the metal. They merely resell the metal,
either through or to the original broker. Many times, the dealer will
hold "itself out as willing (although not legally obligated) to repur-
chase the metal at the then prevailing 'bid price' set by the dealer,
which is usually below the available market price."" a
A. Advantages
The advantages of bank financing programs are several. First,
they increase one's buying power by allowing the matching of one's
own funds with a much larger amount borrowed from a bank. s" This
increases the size of one's investment in precious metals and poten-
tially will increase the size of one's return on the investment. 8 The
availability of such programs allows individual investors to structure
their investments in precious metals as they see fit.
Second, precious metals "offer the owner the only hard asset
known that maintains two qualities not found in any other assets: (1)
instant liquidity, and (2) instant financibility."39 This essentially
means that an individual may rapidly sell his or her metals, or may
obtain a loan against equity that one may have in the precious met-
als. This is not necessarily the case with other investment vehicles.
Third, bank financing programs promote flexibility within an in-
dividual's investment portfolio by permitting the ownership of
smaller increments of precious metals.4 Futures trading, on the
other hand, involves larger, standardized minimum contract sizes.4'
35. Generally, the loans are demand loans which have no fixed term. While banks
charge a loan origination fee with interest floating at or near the prime rate, no banks charge
prepayment penalties. Some banks, however, only lend for a maximum six-month term and
require that a two or three percent fee be paid to "roll" the loan into each subsequent six
month period. This could be a costly feature to a long-term investor. The investor is also
charged a storage fee, which covers the insuring and safekeeping of the metal held as collat-
eral. See generally Clark, supra note 7; ICTA, supra note 26.
36. Investor Alert, supra note 10.
37. This type of transaction has been analogized to the purchase of a car or house with
the aid of a bank loan or mortgage. See Clark, supra note 7.
38. See id. An individual investor must take note that
should precious metals prices decline rather than rise, the financed precious met-
als investment can decline two, three or four times as much in value. Hence,
financing one's precious metals investment may not be suitable for the individual
who is uncomfortable with "highly leveraged" market positions or who may dis-
like borrowing money for any purpose.
ICTA, supra note 26, at 2.
39. Richard S. Love, Statement Before the Advisory Committee on CFTC-State Coop-
eration 2 (Oct. 8, 1987) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office) [hereinafter Love].
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id.
BANK FINANCED METALS TRADING
These programs always give the individual control over decisions to
buy or sell.4 This affords the investor the ability to manage his
money as he sees fit. Lastly, precious metals financing also allows
lending institutions to serve the general public better by providing a
more diversified product line in the increasingly competitive field of
financial services.
B. Potential Problems
The bank financing of precious metals is a relatively new
method of ownership and as a new product it has experienced
problems. Problems created by unscrupulous or just plain inex-
perienced Broker/Dealer activities such as non-disclosure of
costs and risks, speculation with client funds, [and] non-delivery
of the product to the safety net of the banks. The main source of
these problems is lack of regulation. There are no rules, no
guidelines to be followed. There are no means of enforcement
and therefore when problems do occur it is too late. The damage
is done and in most cases the client suffers the loss.4"
Many times, bank-financed precious metal sales begin with a
soliciting dealer, which may or may not be licensed or regulated by
any state or federal regulatory body."" Sales representatives of these
42. Id.
43. Id. at 4. The Investor Alert, stated that
[s]ince the sale of precious metals through bank financing programs is es-
sentially unregulated, there is nothing to prevent felons or persons with no
knowledge or experience in precious metals trading from setting up "companies"
to mass market such programs to the unsuspecting public. Furthermore, unlike
licensed securities or commodities dealers, who are subject to industry guidelines
and rules of business behavior as well as constant scrutiny from federal and state
regulators, purveyors of precious metals bank financing programs are subject to
no internal or external restraints. These sellers are basically free to shoot from
the hip and let the investor be damned.
Investor Alert, supra note 10, at 4.
44. The following is an example of a sales pitch used by a hard-selling broker:
Hello, Fred, this is Tom with such and such a company. How have you
been? Great! We spoke about six months ago. At that time I recommended that
you take a position in the silver market. Had you taken our advice, that $ 10,000
would now have returned over 65%. Now that's not too shabby - is it Fred?
[Now, of course, the call has never taken place six months ago, but the man
doesn't remember.] Fred, I didn't call you to rub salt in your wounds, but you
did tell me to get back in touch with you when I had something hot. I've got
something right now that is absolutely outstanding! Fred, before we get started,
if I could show you the same kind of return as before you could handle $10,000-
$25,000 today when you see it's a winner. Right? Great! Fred, you make your
own investment decisions, right? Great! Go get a pen and a piece of paper and
I'll hold. Now, [Guardian Trust] has the unique program which allows investors
like yourself, Fred, the opportunity to purchase precious metals with bank fi-
nancing. We can control 100% of the metals by putting only 20% down. The
bank finances 80% using the metal as collateral and you reap 100% of the
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dealers may make numerous "cold calls"'4 5 each day in search of pro-
spective investors. Unscrupulous dealers often obtain the names of
people to contact by placing advertisements or short, enticing leads
in various publications, which offer free literature to those who fill
out and return a reply card containing their name, address and tele-
phone number."' Instead of, or in addition to, receiving the free liter-
ature, the individual may receive an unexpected call from a salesper-
son located in a distant city.47 An unwary individual may then be
persuaded by the hard-selling salesperson into participating in the
investment without knowing the full nature of the transaction. These
operators frequently invoke the name of a reputable leading bank in
their sales pitch in order to calm any investor fears.48
A major concern of regulators is that the brokers fail, at the
time of sale, to fully disclose the relevant details including costs,
fees, and risks involved in the programs."' A fraudulent broker may
forego disclosure of its commission, as well as the amount upon
profits. Follow me so far? Great! .... The absolute worst thing that could
happen is you have an equity call, which could work to your advantage. You
then have the ability to lower your loan by roughly 10%, and lower the interest
in that loan. After all Fred, you and I both agree the market is going to explode.
Right? Now, you didn't go with me the last time. That $10,000 would've re-
turned 65%. Now I make a suggestion, let's get started today!
Philip A. Feigin, Assistant Securities Commissioner, State of Colorado, Statement Before the
Advisory Committee on CFTC-State Cooperation (Oct. 8, 1987) (copy on file in Dickinson
Law Review office).
45. A "cold call" is essentially an uninvited telephone call from a salesman who uses a
high-pressured sales pitch in order to try and sell his product.
46. Investor Alert, supra note 10, at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3.
49. State regulators claim that they have been receiving an increasing number of com-
plaints from investors regarding precious metals scams. Among them are lack of full disclosure
by the broker of the details of the program, including costs and fees. The following is an
example of such an investor complaint:
One couple in Michigan learned this the hard way. After their eleven year-
old son sent away for what he thought was a free book on coin collecting, the
couple began receiving calls from a woman in Reno, Nevada trying to pressure
them into a precious metals buying program. After repeated phone calls the
couple's sales resistance was finally worn down and they agreed to buy. They
wired $11,000 to the seller without knowing exactly what they were buying. An
hour later the saleswoman called back and said she had "decided" to buy plati-
num and silver for them at prices higher than quoted earlier that day. After the
sale went through, the saleswoman informed the couple that she would "only"
charge them a 13% commission - but on the $33,000 metals "position," not
the $11,000 the couple had put down. Then came other surprises, like the $700
recurring "loan fee" and the $1,300 "overage fee" on their silver purchase.
Even though both platinum and silver prices rose after the couple bought,
they could not break even because of the expenses they had incurred. Six months
after investing they had spent over $14,000 and had lost all hope of getting out
of the bank financing program hole.
Investor Alert, supra note 10, at 4.
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which it is based.50 Any profit that the investor may have realized if
the market price of the metal increased may be quickly offset by the
dealer's commission and the costs involved in the loan."1 The risks
involved in owning precious metals can also be great, mainly due to
the inherent volatility in the world markets for precious metals."2 A
wide variety of factors may affect the market prices of the metals.53
Another important concern voiced by regulators is "whether or
not the full amount of the metal purportedly sold to each investor is,
in fact, being held for the investor by a reliable financial institution
or approved depository." 4 It may be possible that an unscrupulous
bank or broker may not buy the metal outright.55 Rather, it may
cover its obligations by buying futures contracts on recognized com-
modity exchanges.56 This would amount to speculation 57 and could
result in the bank or broker being caught with insufficient reserves of
50. Normally, a dealer's commission is calculated as a percentage of the total price of
the metal, an amount which includes the investor's cash down payment plus the loan proceeds
provided by the lender. See ICTA, supra note 26, at 3.
51. See Investor Alert, supra note 10, at 4.
52. Some experts suggest that precious metals investment is not a game for novice inves-
tors. As a "rule of thumb," the Investor Alert stated that
While it may make sense for some people to put a small percentage of their
investment dollars (5 % to 15 %, for instance) into precious metals for diversifi-
cation purposes, and as a hedge against inflation, only the most experienced and
knowledgeable traders should consider subjecting any greater portion of their
available investment funds to the hazards of the precious metals market.
Id. at 5.
53. The price of precious metals fluctuates in response to a number of factors including
"world supply and demand, inflationary expectations, government economic policies and cur-
rency exchange rates." Id.
54. Id. at 3. On two separate occasions in 1986 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion ("FDIC") audited the Valley State Bank of Encino, California, a participant in bank
financing programs. As a result of its investigations, the FDIC determined that the bank had
on hand only a fraction of the metals it was supposed to be holding. The FDIC, which regu-
lates and insures banks, then ordered Valley State Bank to raise its capital. See Bernstein,
FDIC Questions Bank's Lending Practices, L.A. Herald Examiner, July 26, 1987, at D3, col.
l [hereinafter Bernstein]. Since that time, Valley State Bank has gone out-of-business. Initial
reports, however, indicate that the bank's closing was not tied to its precious metals financing
programs.
55. See Investor Alert, supra note 10, at 3. Banks cannot legally lend money for pre-
cious metals unless they hold the metal as collateral in an approved vault. "Otherwise the
transaction is illegal - it is considered not a loan but a leveraged futures contract, made
without the consumer protection offered by a legitimate commodities exchange." Bernstein,
supra note 54, at D5, col. 3.
56. An unscrupulous bank might also cover its obligations inadequately, or not at all,
and thereby gamble on the market value of the metal. "Doing any of these things could create
a large cash float for the bank that it could use for its own speculative purposes, while simulta-
neously charging the metals investors interest on the bogus loans that were supposed to have
been used to buy metal." Investor Alert, supra note 10, at 3. For a discussion of what consti-
tutes a "futures contract," see infra notes 98-126 and accompanying text.
57. "Speculation" is a form of risk-taking, in which an investor in commodity futures
seeks to achieve profits through the successful anticipation of price movements. See CFTC,
GLOSSARY OF TRADING TERMS 52 (1987).
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metal.
The main focus of the regulatory investigation into bank financ-
ing programs is on the activity of fraudulent brokers, or so-called
"boiler-room operators." 58 These are fly-by-night operations, which
often take advantage of unsuspecting individuals. However, because
lenders are becoming increasingly involved in these transactions, reg-
ulators would like to establish a principal-agent relationship between
the lender and the broker as a means of reaching fraudulent bro-
kers. 9 This would allow an investor who has been bilked of his
money by a fraudulent broker to have recourse against the lender as
a principal of the broker. Regulators also believe that the lenders
should be required to thoroughly investigate the brokers with whom
they deal, so that they do not do business with "boiler-room
operators." 60
The last major concern of regulators in this field is that few, if
any, lenders do thorough credit investigations of the individuals to
whom they lend."1 The main reason lenders do not thoroughly inves-
tigate the investors, as they would in other lending situations, is be-
cause the loan is secured, and the bank has possession of the metal
as collateral.6 2 In most lending arrangements, this is not the case.
Regulators, however, would like to impose "know your customer"
type rules upon the lenders, in order to ensure that over-extended
consumers do not get involved in these programs.6 3 This, according
to regulators, would afford another layer of protection for the gen-
eral public.
58. Regulators are also concerned about the participation of lenders in these programs
because, as Philip Feigin, Assistant Securities Commissioner of Colorado, stated, some believe
that "[t]he banks are giving an imprimatur of legitimacy to dishonest dealers." Scott, supra
note 13, at 18, col. 2.
59. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 30. Fowler West, a CFTC commissioner stated:
Some of the blame has to fall on the banks. It's too easy to get a hold of
loan forms, and a good number of banks have fairly lax screening procedures for
affiliated brokers. This is a big business for them and, in this instance, our hal-
lowed banking institutions are getting away with murder.
Lanchner, Scam Artists Find Pay Dirt in Gold Investors, USA Today, Aug. 20, 1987, at 4B,
col. I.
60. According to Commissioner Fowler West of the CFTC, "[tihe banks don't know or
don't appear to want to know what the dealer's [sic] doing. They're afraid tht if there's any
connection, they might be held liable for the dealer's actions." Scott, supra note 13.
61. See Scott, supra note 13, at 20, col. 1. As stated by Philip Feigin, Assistant Securi-
ties Commissioner of Colorado, "[siure the banks are protected, but what about the custom-
ers?" Id.
62. However, if metals prices fell to a great extent and the customers were unable to
meet the margin calls, then the lender may suffer an unsecured loss. This is an unlikely scena-
rio, but nevertheless is possible. Id.
63. See infra text accompanying note 238.
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III. Potential Regulation of Bank Financing Programs Under the
Commodities Exchange Act
The CEA64 grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction 65 to regulate
futures contracts, option contracts and leverage contracts. The Com-
mission's jurisdiction, however, does not encompass "forward" deliv-
ery contracts, which are essentially cash transactions that provide for
later delivery of the underlying commodity."' The CEA, enacted in
1936 and subsequently amended numerous times, contains a compre-
hensive scheme of federal regulation governing almost all aspects of
commodity futures trading on regulated contract markets as well as
certain off-exchange transactions.67 The CEA also requires that fu-
tures and commodity option contracts be traded exclusively on desig-
nated contract markets,68 which are closely supervised by the
CFTC. 9 In addition, the CEA includes extensive registration and
licensing requirements, as well as substantive prohibitions and re-
porting obligations, which are imposed upon participants in these
transactions.
70
The CFTC has taken the position that, unless an entity offers
one or more of the instruments referenced above, it lacks the author-
ity to regulate the entity's conduct.7 1 Therefore, in order to deter-
mine if bank financing programs are subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the CFTC, one must first inquire whether a bank financing
program can properly be considered either a futures contract, lever-
age contract, or an exempt "forward" delivery contract. This is es-
sentially the approach that the CFTC has taken in Interpretive Let-
64. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982).
65. The CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction is established in title 7, Section 2(a) of the United
States Code. 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1982 & Supp. Il 1985).
66. See Gilberg, Precious Metals Trading - The Last Frontier of Unregulated Invest-
ment, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 961-62 (1984) [hereinafter Precious Metals Trading].
67. See Markham and Gilberg, Federal Regulation of Bank Activities in the Commodi-
ties Markets, 39 Bus. LAW 1719, 1725 (1984) [hereinafter Markham and Gilberg]. See also
Precious Metals Trading, supra note 66, at 961 n.82.
68. The CFTC is authorized to designate any board of trade as a "contract market"
only when such board of trade complies with the requirements in title 7, Section 7(a) and (b)
of the United States Code. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-7b (1982).
69. See Precious Metals Trading, supra note 66, at 961 n.82.
70. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 67, at 1725. The CEA requires the registration
of all commodity professionals as futures commission merchants, introducing brokers, associ-
ated persons, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, or floor brokers. Each
category of registration carries with it a number of ongoing regulatory requirements. See also
7 U.S.C. §§ 6d-6p (1982).
71. See Commodity Investment Fraud II. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
145, 204-09 (1984) [hereinafter PSI Hearings] (statement of Dennis Klejna, Director of
CFTC Division of Enforcement). See also Precious Metals Trading, supra note 66, at 962.
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ter 85-271 in which it analyzes the potential regulatory problems of a
bank financing program.
A. Current State of the Law - CFTC Interpretive Letter 85-2
On August 6, 1985, the CFTC's Office of the General Counsel
("OGC") issued Interpretive Letter 85-2, which concludes that a
precious metals bank financing program would not violate the CEA
or applicable CFTC regulations.7 3 Although not intended as such at
the time it was issued, "85-2 has effectively provided a detailed
blueprint for firms to avoid running afoul of the jurisdiction" of the
CFTC.74 This letter only addressed the involvement of the lender
and, therefore, did not express any opinion regarding the lawfulness
of the activities of the dealers who sell the precious metals to the
public.
75
The letter examined a bank's lending arrangement to finance
the purchase of precious metals by an individual from a broker.7 6
The details of the transaction were typical of most bank financing
programs.7 The letter mainly focused on whether the transaction
was either a leverage contract or a futures contract within the mean-
ing of the CEA and applicable CFTC regulations. 8 Collaterally, the
letter also addressed whether the Model State Commodity Code
("Model Code") may also apply to these transactions. 9
The OGC first concluded that such transactions are excluded
from the definition of a leverage contract because their duration is
less than ten years.80 The opinion focused on the fact that ownership
of the metal is actually transferred from the dealer or bank to the
purchaser by the second business day after the execution of the
72. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985).
73. See id.
74. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 29 (statement of CFTC Commissioner Fowler
West). The CFTC and NASAA exerted considerable effort in drafting the Model Code and
persuading states to adopt it. Commissioner West, however, pointed out that Interpretive Let-
ter 85-2 highlights certain exemptions to the Model Code that would allow participants in
bank financing programs to avoid the jurisdiction of state regulatory agencies. Although sev-
eral states have adopted the Model Code, 85-2 "addresses, in short, ways that schemes may
find to be exempted under" the Code. Id. at 29-30.
75. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673, at 30,858 (Aug. 6, 1985).
76. Id. at 30,855.
77. See supra notes 20-62 and accompanying text for an explanation of a typical bank
financing program.
78. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673, at 30,855 (Aug. 6, 1985).
79. Id. at 30,857.
80. Id. at 30,856.
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transaction. 1 "As a result, the transaction [is] more like a tradi-
tional bank financing arrangement."8 1
Second, the OGC stated that these transactions are not futures
contracts because delivery actually occurs-either through transfer
of documents of title or confirmation-within two business days of
the execution of the deal.8" The OGC concluded that these programs
"lack that element of futurity which is an essential characteristic of
a futures contract, and would, in all material aspects, be more in the
nature of spot transactions with delivery and payment for the under-
lying commodity occurring essentially contemporaneously with the
execution of the transaction."84 The OGC pointed out, however, that
these programs could be considered futures contracts if the dealer or
bank stood ready to repurchase the metal upon the purchaser's de-
mand. 85 The apparent rationale underlying that conclusion is that a
repurchase arrangement would provide a means of price speculation
in the metals and, therefore, would operate in a manner substantially
similar to futures contracts."
Finally, the OGC concluded that the Model Code would also be
unlikely to prohibit bank-financed precious metal sales because the
lender could avail itself of an exemption for transactions in which
physical delivery of the precious metal is made within seven days of
the original deal.8 Because transfer of the requisite certificate or
documents of title to the purchaser occurs within two to seven days
of the sale and because a financial institution would be holding the
metal rather than a dealer, the OGC concluded that the Model
Code's exemptive provision would apply.88 The interpretive letter
points out that the Model Code deems confirmations or transfers of
documents of title to constitute good delivery.89 The OGC, however,
stressed at the outset of its analysis of the Model Code that its views
did not necessarily reflect the views of NASAA or any individual
state that may have adopted the Code.90
Currently, the CFTC is gathering information regarding bank
81. Id.
82. Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1675.
83. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673, at 30,856 (Aug. 6, 1985).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1676.
87. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
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financing programs in order to reexamine its position with regard to
Interpretive Letter 85-2. 91 It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinize
these transactions in light of the analysis contained in Interpretive
Letter 85-2 in order to determine whether they properly should be
regulated under the CEA, CFTC regulations, or Model State Com-
modity Code.
B. Analysis
The lenders involved in precious metals financing programs gen-
erally view these transactions as no more than collateralized loans.92
At most, the lenders would classify these programs as cash or "spot"
transactions93 or as exempt "forward" delivery contracts.9" Lenders,
therefore, believe that their participation in these transactions does
not raise any issues under the current commodities or securities
laws. 95 Several cases and CFTC opinions which construe the com-
modities and securities laws, however, command that one examine
each transaction in context, and "not hesitate to look behind
whatever label the parties may give to the instrument."9  One must,
therefore, focus on the economic realities97 of bank financing pro-
91. See Hanbury Letter, supra note 5. See also Transcript, supra note 8, at 17;
NASAA Resolution, supra note 11.
92. The philosophy of most lenders that participate in banking financing programs is
that these programs involve collateral lending, as opposed to credit lending. Collateral lending
focuses mainly on the value of the collateral as security for the loan, whereas credit lending
focuses heavily on the credit history and financial condition of the borrower. See Scott
Copenhaver, Statement Before the Advisory Committee on CFTC-State Cooperation (Oct. 8,
1987) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office).
93. A "spot transaction" involves both immediate payment and immediate delivery of
the underlying commodity. See CFTC, GLOSSARY OF TRADING TERMS 52 (1987). The CFTC
and SEC both have opined that actual purchases of physical gold or silver, which involve the
physical delivery of the metals or the transfer of title to the purchaser, are outside of their
jurisdiction and raise no regulatory concerns. See, e.g., CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2,
[1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985); PSI Hear-
ings, supra note 71, at 199-203 (statement of John M. Fedders, then Director of the SEC
Division of Enforcement) [hereinafter Fedders' Testimony]. See also infra notes 210-13 and
accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 98-126 and accompanying text.
95. See generally Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1673.
96. In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 20,941, at
23,779 (CFTC Dec. 6, 1979). Accord Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d
573 (9th Cir. 1982); Precious Metals Assocs., Inc. v. CFTC, 620 F.2d 900 (1st Cir. 1980);
CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); CFTC v. U.S.
Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re First Nat'l Monetary Corp.,
[1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 21,707 (CFTC Apr. 29, 1983);
CFTC v. Commercial Petrolera Internacional, S.A., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 11 21,222 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981).
97. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). Accord United Housing Found.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); CFTC v. U.S.
Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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grams in order to determine if they should be regulated under the
commodities or securities laws.
1. Are Bank Financing Programs Futures or "Forward" De-
livery Contracts?--Section 4(a) of the CEA98 prohibits any "con-
tract for the purchase or sale of a commodity for future delivery"
and any "dealing" in such contracts, except for those traded on a
"designated contract market." '99 The CEA, however, does not define
the meaning of a contract for "future delivery," 100 although the Act
does state that "[t]he term 'future delivery' . . . shall not include
any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or deliv-
ery."10 1 It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether a bank fi-
nancing program is, in essence, a futures contract, or whether it is
exempt from regulation under the "deferred" or "forward" delivery
exception.102 Although there is no "bright-line" test to distinguish
these two instruments, numerous CFTC and court opinions have
construed their meanings.103
In distinguishing futures contracts from forward contracts, the
CFTC and courts primarily have focused on the commercial nature
of the contracts and on whether physical delivery of commodities
usually occurs.10 4 In fact, the CFTC's Office of General Counsel
("OGC") stated in an internal memorandum that
(1) Congress intended generally to prohibit any public mar-
keting of contracts for the future delivery of commodities - in
the plain and literal meaning of that phrase - except through
the facilities of a designated contract market, and (2) this com-
plete prohibition was intended to be subject to an exception
solely for the benefit of persons involved in a commercial cash
commodity business, which would allow them to effect cash sales
of a commodity, contemplating actual delivery as a matter of
course, but in which delivery of the commodity might be de-
98. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982).
99. Id. at § 6(a). This subsection empowers the CFTC to prohibit such transactions
unless they are "conducted on or subject to the rules of a board of trade which has been
designated" as a contract market by the CFTC. Id. at § 6(a)(1). A "board of trade" is defined
in the CEA as "any exchange or association, whether incorporated or unincorporated, of per-
sons who shall be engaged in the business of buying or selling any commodity or receiving the
same for sale or consignment." Id. at § 2.
100. See Markham and Gilberg, supra note 67, at 1726.
101. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). This is commonly known as the "deferred" or "forward" deliv-
ery exemption. See Markham and Gilberg, supra note 67, at 1726.
102. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
103. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
104. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1606.
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ferred for the purpose of commercial convenience or necessity.1"'
This conclusion was later reiterated in In re Stoval1 06 in which
the CFTC held that the forward contract or deferred delivery ex-
emption "was intended to cover only contracts for sale which are
entered into with the expectation that delivery of the actual com-
modity will eventually occur through performance on the
contracts."10
In Stovall, the CFTC identified what are now considered to be
the four "classic elements" of a futures contract: (1) the existence of
"standardized contracts for the purchase or sale of commodities
which provide for future, as opposed to immediate, delivery . ..;"
(2) instruments that are "directly or indirectly offered to the general
public . . .;" (3) transactions that are "generally secured by earnest
money, or 'margin';" and (4) transactions that
are entered into primarily for the purpose of assuming or shift-
ing the risk of change in value of commodities, rather than
transferring ownership of the actual commodities . . . .Indeed,
most parties to commodity futures contracts extinguish their le-
gal obligations to make or take delivery by offsetting their con-
tracts with equal and opposite transactions prior to the date on
which delivery is called for, accepting a profit or loss for any
differences in price between the initial and offsetting
transactions.108
All four elements need not exist in every case. Their presence, how-
ever, could evidence the existence of such an instrument.10 9 Several
post-Stovall decisions have relied and elaborated upon this
definition.110
Recent interpretive releases from the OGC, including Interpre-
105. Memorandum of CFTC Office of General Counsel, reprinted in [1977-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,772, at 23,165 (Sept. 5, 1978) (Exhibit 1).
106. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at 23,775
(CFTC Dec. 6, 1979).
107. Id. at 23,777.
108. Id.
109. In Stovall, the CFTC pointed out that they did not intend for the list of elements
to be "an exhaustive catalogue of factors to which [they would] look in every case to deter-
mine whether an instrument is a cash contract for deferred shipment or delivery or is a com-
modity futures contract." Id. at 23,779.
110. CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
First Nat'l Monetary Corp., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,707 (CFTC Apr. 29, 1983); Jackson v. American Gold Dealers Ass'n, [1982-1984 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 21,956 (CFTC Jan. 9, 1983); CFTC v. Commercial
Petrolera Internacional, S.A., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
21,222 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1981).
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tive Letter 85-2,111 however, have placed greater emphasis on
whether delivery of the commodity is required and ordinarily occurs,
despite their lip service to the Stovall criteria. " 2 Therefore, if deliv-
ery of the commodity is intended and ordinarily occurs, the CFTC is
less likely to find that the instrument is a futures contract even if the
other Stovall factors are present.113 On the other hand, the absence
of the Stovall factors may not prevent the finding of a futures con-
tract if delivery is unlikely."'
In the case of bank financing programs, several Stovall ele-
ments' " may be deemed to exist. Clearly, these programs are offered
directly to the public and also require a down-payment of "earnest
money" to secure the purchase of the metal from the dealer."' One
could also argue that many of the terms of these financing programs
are somewhat standardized, despite a particular lender offering dif-
fering payment terms on the loan."' The presence of these factors,
however, is not conclusive of the existence of a futures contract.
The CFTC, in Interpretive Letter 85-2,11 a focused heavily on
the delivery aspect of these programs." 9 The CFTC deemed that
bank financing programs are not futures contracts because delivery
would occur within two business days of the original transaction, ei-
ther through transfer of documents of title or by written confirma-
tion sent to the purchaser. 2 0 The fact that title to the metal actually
11. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985).
112. See CFrC Statutory Interpretation - The Regulation of Leverage Transactions
and Other Off-Exchange Future Delivery Type Instruments, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,518, at 30,260 (Mar. 25, 1985). The OGC stated that fu-
tures contracts contain one or some of the following elements: (1) the purchase or sale of a
commodity for future delivery for a price determined at the time of contract; (2) standardized
terms; (3) they are not entered into for the purpose of obtaining delivery of the commodity,
but primarily for shifting the risk of commodity price changes; and (4) they are discharged
through offsetting transactions or buy-back arrangements. Id. at 30,261. See also Gilberg,
supra note 2, at 1607.
113. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1607-08.
114. See id. Gilberg points out that "[a]lthough the CFTC has not abandoned explicitly
the 'classic' definition of a futures contract, recent statements indicate a shift away from it,
and therefore the state of the law is at best unclear." Id. at 1608.
115. See supra text accompanying note 108.
116. See supra text accompanying note 22.
117. Most lenders charge a loan origination fee with interest floating at or near the
prime rate, but no lenders charge prepayment penalties. Some banks, however, make these
loans "with no fixed term and give the borrower the option of interest only; others lend for a
maximum term of six months and require that a two or three percent fee be paid to "roll" the
loan into each subsequent six month period." Clark, supra note 7. This could be costly to a
long-term investor.
118. CFTC, Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673, at 30,854 (Aug. 6, 1985).
119. See id. at 30,856.
120. Id.
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passes to the purchaser within two to seven days, however, should
not end the inquiry. Actual physical delivery of the metals is not
made from the broker to the purchaser, rather the broker transfers
the metals to the lender for storage and to hold as security for the
loan. 2' All that the purchaser actually receives is a piece of paper
representing his ownership of the precious metals.'22
Although lenders expect the purchasers to take actual delivery
of the metals when the loans are paid off, the economic reality of
these programs is that very few purchasers actually take physical
delivery of the metals. These programs thus look more like futures
contracts then exempted deferred delivery contracts. In fact, the pur-
chaser resells the metal, usually through the original broker, and
pays off the loan balance with the proceeds, thereby realizing a gain
or loss on the entire transaction. Even though the broker has no legal
obligation to repurchase the metal,12 3 this type of transaction, if used
to offset the original purchases, may be conclusive in the finding of a
futures contract.1
2 4
At best, this area of the law is unclear. The major problem fac-
ing the CFTC when it reexamines its position regarding Interpretive
Letter 85-2 is the lack of any formal definition of a futures contract.
When one looks at the substance or economic realities of bank fi-
nancing programs, they exhibit many of the characteristics of fu-
tures contracts. 25 However, when one looks at the law regarding fu-
tures contracts, the inquiry is much more difficult and uncertain.' 26
2. Are Bank Financing Programs Leverage Contracts?-The
CFTC has jurisdiction over leverage contracts pursuant to section 19
of the CEA. 21 Specifically, section 19(a) prohibits any person from
offering to enter into, entering into, or confirming the execution of
any transaction for the delivery of any commodity under a stan-
dardized contract commonly known to the trade as a margin ac-
count, margin contract, leverage account, or leverage contract,
121. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
122. See supra text accompanying note 28.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
124. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673, at 30,856 (Aug. 6, 1985). The CFTC noted that such repurchase ar-
rangements or offsetting transactions could be deemed futures contracts if the dealer or bank
stood ready to repurchase the metals at the prevailing market price upon the customer's de-
mand. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
125. Tom Russo, Statement Before the Advisory Committee on CFTC-State Coopera-
tion (Oct. 8, 1987) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office).
126. See id.
127. 7 U.S.C. § 23 (1982).
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or under any contract, account, arrangement, scheme, or device
that the Commission determines serves the same function or
functions as such a standardized contract, or is marketed or
managed in substantially the same manner as such a standard-
ized contract.12
The CFTC, however, is required under section 19(c) to regulate, not
prohibit, all of these types of transactions. 1 9 Pursuant to this con-
gressional mandate, in 1984 the CFTC adopted regulations regard-
ing leverage transactions. "' As will be shown in the following analy-
sis, bank financing programs are neither within the statutory concept
of a leverage contract's nor within the scope of the definition of a
leverage contract contained in the CFTC regulations. 2
(a) Statutory Concept of a Leverage Contract.-A leverage con-
tract is a special type of standardized long-term contract for the
purchase of a given commodity, including precious metals. 13 Lever-
age contracts are not sold on organized exchanges as are futures con-
tracts; instead, they are sold by firms known as leverage transaction
merchants ("LTMs").3 Under this type of contract, a customer
makes a percentage payment of the spot price at the outset toward
the purchase of a specified amount of a commodity. 3 5 The LTM
then receives periodic finance and service fees and is usually permit-
ted to periodically call for margin from the customer if the market
price of the commodity falls.'36 Actual delivery of the commodity
may be deferred by the customer for the duration of the contract,
normally ten years or more. s3 The leverage contract is eventually
closed out, however, either through delivery of the commodity or by
the repurchase of the contract from the customer." 8
128. Id. at § 23(a).
129. Id. at § 23(c).
130. 17 C.F.R. 31.1-.26 (1986).
131. See supra text accompanying note 128. See also infra notes 133-43 and accompa-
nying text.
132. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
133. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1615.
134. See Markham and Gilberg, supra note 67, at 1723.
135. See id. The "spot price" is "the price at which a physical commodity for immediate
delivery is selling at a given time and place." CFTC, GLOSSARY OF TRADING TERMS 53
(1987).
136. See Markham and Gilberg, supra note 67, at 1723. LTMs must register with the
CFTC. Any employees engaged in the solicitation or acceptance of customer accounts, or in
the supervision of persons so engaged, must register as associated persons. 17 C.F.R. §§ 3.17-
.18 (1986). Also, LTMs are subject to recordkeeping and reporting requirements. See 17
C.F.R. §§ 31.14-.16 (1986).
137. See Markham and Gilberg, supra note 67, at 1723..,
138. Id. at 1723-24.
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When Congress amended the CEA in 1978 and adopted section
19, it had the following understanding of the basic features of a lev-
erage contract:
Generally, the leverage contract currently in use is an
agreement for the purchase or sale of a contract for the delivery
at a later date of a specified commodity in a standard unit and
quality, or the close-out of the contract by an offsetting transac-
tion. The principal characteristics of the contract include: (1)
standard units, quality and terms and conditions; (2) payment
and maintenance of "margin"; (3) close-out by an offsetting
transaction or by delivery, after payment in full; and (4) no
right or interest in a specific lot of the commodity. The leverage
dealer is the principal to every transaction and functions as a
market maker. The leverage dealer, however, does not guarantee
a repurchase market and further reserves the right to cease op-
erating as a market maker or broker for the customer. Most cus-
tomer commitments are covered or "hedged" in futures, for-
wards, or physical inventory; most physical inventory, however,
is encumbered through bank loans. Leverage contract bid/ask
prices are determined by dealer adjustments to spot and futures
market quotations.89
Although the issue has not been officially addressed in any
CFTC or court decisions, it is apparent that a bank financing pro-
gram does not fall within the statutory concept of a leverage con-
tract. First, a bank financing program might be deemed to involve
standard units, quality, terms and conditions. The second basic char-
acteristic, however, the payment or receipt of "margin" based on
dealer adjustments to spot market quotations, may or may not be
deemed present. Although a lender in a bank financing program can
call for a pay-down of the principal on the loan, or for additional
collateral based on a decline in metals prices, 1 0 it is not a typical
"margin" call. 41 Third, lenders in these programs theoretically ex-
pect to make actual delivery of the metal to the purchaser at the
time the loan is paid off and do not expect to have the loan closed
out by an offsetting transaction." 2 However, very few purchasers
ever take delivery of the metal; rather, they resell it and pay-off the
remaining loan balance. Although this resale and subsequent pay-off
139. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2087, 2114.
140. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 32.
142. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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appears to be the type of offsetting transaction that Congress had in
mind, this characteristic is not conclusive in the finding of a leverage
contract because the fourth factor clearly is not satisfied. The pur-
chaser of the metal in a bank financing program does have a right in
a specific lot of metal. In fact, title to the metal actually passes to
the purchaser upon execution of the transaction, and the purchased
metal is actually stored by the lender.143 There is no speculation by
the lenders in bank financing programs. The metal is always pur-
chased and, therefore, these programs are not within the statutory
concept of a leverage contract.
(b) Regulatory Definition of a Leverage Contract.-Pursuant o
congressional authority, " the CFTC promulgated Commission Rule
31.4(w) which generally defines a leverage contract to mean "a con-
tract, standardized as to terms and conditions, for the long-term (ten
years or longer) purchase ("long leverage contract") or sale ("short
leverage contract") by a leverage customer of a leverage commod-
ity," and which also meets several additional criteria as specified in
the regulation. " 5 As the CFTC held in Interpretive Letter 85-2, a
bank financing program is not a leverage contract within the mean-
ing of Rule 31.4(w) and is, therefore, not subject to CFTC regula-
tion as such. " 6
Bank financing programs are clearly distinguishable from the
regulatory definition of leverage contracts. The duration of a lever-
age contract under Rule 31.4(w) is at least ten years, " whereas the
143. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
144. 7 U.S.C. § 23(b)(1) (1982).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 31.4(w) (1986). The other additional criteria are:
(I) Participation by the leverage transaction merchant as a principal in
each leverage transaction;
(2) Initial and maintenance margin payments by the leverage customer;
(3) Periodic payment by the leverage customer or accrual by the leverage
transaction merchant of a variable carrying charge or fee on the unpaid balance
of a long leverage contract, and periodic payment or crediting by the leverage
transaction merchant to the leverage customer of a variable carrying charge or
fee on the initial value of the contract plus any margin deposits made by the
leverage customer in connection with a short leverage contract;
(4) Delivery of a commodity in an amount and form which can be readily
purchased and sold in normal commercial or retail channels.
(5) Delivery of the leverage commodity after satisfaction of the balance due
on the contract; and
(6) Determination of the contract purchase and repurchase, or sale and re-
sale prices by the leverage transaction merchant.
Id.
146. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673, at 30,855-56 (Aug. 6, 1985).
147. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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loan in a bank financing program does not have a duration of at least
ten years. The regulatory definition of a leverage contract also antic-
ipates that transfer of ownership of the underlying commodity will
not occur until the end of the lending arrangement, or earlier if the
customer elects to take delivery.1"8 That is not the case with bank
financing programs. These programs transfer ownership of the pre-
cious metals by the second business day after execution of the trans-
action.149 They do not wait to transfer certificate of title until the
loan is paid off. Since bank financing programs do not meet the
CFTC's definition of leverage contracts, they are not within the
CFTC's regulatory jurisdiction and are not subject to CFTC regis-
tration and regulation as such.
3. Are Bank Financing Programs covered under the Model
State Commodity Code?-In 1985, NASAA adopted the Model
State Commodity Code'50 as part of a coordinated effort among fed-
eral and state regulatory agencies "to protect the public from opera-
tors who purvey so-called commodity investments to the unwary at a
loss of millions of dollars nationwide." 5 ' The discovery of several
large off-exchange precious metals scams spurred the state and fed-
eral regulators to take action. 152 The Model Code was intended to
bring certain entities that deal in commodities, which were ostensibly
unregulated by an federal or state agency, within the scope of some
regulatory framework. 153
Generally, the Model Code "prohibits the offer and sale of any
off-exchange contract for the purchase or sale of commodities, pri-
marily for investment or speculation and not for the acquisition or
disposition of the underlying commodities.' 54 At the same time,
however, "the code is designed to complement the federal commodity
laws by permitting the public to trade or invest in legitimate com-
modity instruments under the Commodity Exchange Act and under
148. See supra note 145.
149. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
150. See Model Code, supra note 15, at 30,449.
151. Id.
152. The two most celebrated precious metals scandals in 1983-84 involved Bullion Re-
serve of North America and the International Gold Bullion Exchange. They were perpetrated
by persons ostensibly unregulated by any federal or state agency. These dealers operated for
several years by soliciting customers through "cold calls" and building up enormous reserves of
deposits, but using only a small amount of the deposits, if any, to purchase actual metals for
customers. Eventually, state authorities forced these two operators out-of-business, leaving
25,000 creditors in the wake of the collapse, with claims of over $75 million. See Precious
Metals Trading, supra note 66, at 947-49.
153. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1676 n.307.
154. Id.
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the specific terms of the Code."' 55 To date, only a few states have
adopted the Model Code, in whole or in part, but other states are
still considering it. 56
Under Section 1.02 of the Model Code, 57 it is unlawful for any
person to "purchase or offer to sell or purchase any commodity
under any commodity contract . . . or offer to enter into or enter
into as seller or purchaser any commodity contract" 58 except as pro-
vided for in Section 1.03 159 or 1.04.160 The definition of a "commod-
ity contract" in section 1.01(e), however, does not
include any contract or agreement which requires, and under
which the purchaser receives, within 28 [or other period deter-
mined by the state] calendar days from the payment in good
funds of any portion of the purchase price, physical delivery of
the total amount of each commodity to be purchased under the
contract or agreement. 6'
Under this definition, it is possible that a state may not view a bank
financing program as a "commodity contract" because the purchaser
receives title to the metal and the metal is delivered from the broker
to the lender, all within two to seven days.6 2 This is well within the
twenty-eight day period set forth in the definition."" The conclusion
that bank financing programs are not covered by the Model Code is
supported by Section 1.04(a)(2), which states that physical delivery
has occurred if, within seven days, the purchased precious metals are
delivered into the possession of a depository which is either a finan-
cial institution or other specified entity.'
The CFTC in Interpretive Letter 85-2 stated that even if a bank
financing program was "viewed as a 'commodity contract,' an ex-
emption would be available by operation of section 1.04(a)(2)."'
155. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at 30,449.
156. See supra note 15.
157. MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at 30,451-3.
158. Id. at 30,451-3.
159. Section 1.03 provides a list of "exempt person transactions." See id. at 30,451-3 to
30,453.
160. Section 1.04 provides a list of "exempt transactions." See id. at 30,453.
161. See id. at 30,451-3.
162. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673, at 30,857 n.4 (Aug. 6, 1985).
163. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at 30,451-3; CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2,
[1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,673, at 30,857 (Aug. 6, 1985).
164. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at 30,453; and CFTC Interpretive Letter No.
85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673, at 30,857 (Aug. 6,
1985).
165. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673, at 30,857 (Aug. 6, 1985).
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The section 1.04(a)(2) exemption applies to any commodity contract
under which the purchaser receives, within seven days from the pay-
ment of any portion of the purchase price, physical delivery of the
precious metals purchased. "Physical delivery" under this exemption
islee
deemed to have occurred if, within such 7 day period, such
quantity of precious metals purchased by such payment is deliv-
ered . . . into the possession of a depository (other than the
seller) which is either (i) a financial institution [or other speci-
fied entity] and such depository . .-. issues and the purchaser
receives, a certificate, document of title, confirmation or other
instrument evidencing that such quantity of precious metals has
been delivered to the depository and is being and will continue
to be held by the depository on the purchaser's behalf .... "',
Because the lender in a bank financing program is a financial institu-
tion and receives delivery of the precious metal within seven days of
the purchase,"'8 the section 1.04(a)(2) exemption would apply. 169
This is so, as long as the lender transfers the requisite documents of
title to the purchaser.1 70
While this conclusion is in accord with that in Interpretive Let-
ter 85-2,171 and also presents a persuasive argument, it must be
stressed that NASAA, or any state which may adopt the Model
Code, may adopt a differing interpretation.17 2 Therefore, any specific
determination of the applicability of the Model Code to bank financ-
ing programs would have "to be made by the appropriate state offi-
cials of the states in which the transactions were to be marketed and
wherein the Code may have been adopted. 173
166. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at 30,453; and CFTC Interpretive Letter No.
85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673, at 30,857 (Aug. 6,
1985).
167. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at 30,453.
168. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
169. See MODEL CODE, supra note 15, at 30,453; CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2,
[1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673, at 30,857 (Aug. 6, 1985).
170. See CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 9 22,673, at 30,857 (Aug. 6, 1985). See also supra text accompanying note
167.
171. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 22,673, at 30,854 (Aug. 6, 1985).
172. Id. at 30,857. The CFTC stated that "[t]he views set forth below regarding the
Model Code are the views of this Office and do not necessarily reflect the views of NASAA or
any individual state that may adopt this Code." Id.
173. Id.
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IV. Potential Regulation of Bank Financing Programs Under the
Federal Securities Laws
Several laws governing the securities industry may be applicable
to bank financing programs. The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act") covers the issuance, offer, and sale of securities,"' whereas the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") regulates bro-
kerage firms, exchanges, and transactions in securities.175 Both of
these statutes establish a comprehensive set of regulatory require-
ments, and each contains a broad definition of the term "secur-
ity."17 Unlike a futures contract under the CEA, "a security repre-
sents not a contractual arrangement on underlying goods or articles,
but, broadly speaking, an interest of some sort in an enterprise or
business. '"177
The securities laws and applicable Securities Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC") Regulations cover the manner in which securities
are traded, and more importantly, the types of information required
to be provided to investors.178 Also, the Securities Act requires the
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
175. Id. at §§ 78a-78kk.
176. The Securities Act of 1933 defines the term "security" to include:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certif-
icate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, invest-
ment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, frac-
tional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, strad-
dle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index
of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a similar definition
of "security":
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement or any oil, gas or other mineral royalty or
lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "secur-
ity"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certif-
icate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceed-
ing nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity
of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982).
177. Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1620-21.
178. Securities Act registration requires the preparation of a detailed registration state-
ment disclosing the financial condition and other aspects of the issuer's business. Also, the
issuer must comply with applicable state statutes known as "blue sky" laws which may require
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registration of any offering of securities, subject to several enumer-
ated exceptions. 17' In order to determine if a bank financing program
is subject to regulation under the securities laws, one must first de-
termine if such a program can properly be deemed a security.
18 °
Under the applicable definitions of a "security," it is possible that a
bank financing program may be subject to regulation as an "invest-
ment contract," "note," or other "evidence of indebtedness."1 8
A. Is a Bank Financing Program an Investment Contract?
The Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.' 82 held that "an
investment contract for the purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party."'8 3 It is now generally held
that the Howey test is satisfied if four factors are present: "(1) an
investment of money; (2) [the] investment being made in a 'common
enterprise'; (3) an expectation of profits from the investment; and
(4) [the] expectation being based upon the efforts of a third
party.' 1 84 This landmark decision has been expounded upon by the
courts and the SEC. 8'5 In fact, the Supreme Court later refined the
Howey definition in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,8"
by stating that an investment contract exists if individuals are
prompted to invest through a "significant, realistic" expectation of
"substantial" profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or mana-
registration of the offering in more than one state. See id. at 1621 n.100 (citing L. Loss.
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 92-166 (1983)).
179. See id. at 1621.
180. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
181. See id.
182. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
183. Id. at 298-99. The Howey decision was partially based upon an earlier Supreme
Court opinion which had addressed the "investment contract" issue in more general terms. See
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). The Court in Joiner stated that the
Securities Act was designed to reach novel, uncommon, or irregular devices that could be
shown to have been "widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which estab-
lished their character in commerce as 'investment contracts.'" Id. at 351. The Court held that
the presence or absence of a security must be made on a case-by-case basis, turning on "what
character the instrument is given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribu-
tion, and the economic inducements held out to the prospect." Id. at 352-53.
184. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1623.
185. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982); International Brotherhood
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975), reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96
(7th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 887 (1972); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
186. 421 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975).
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gerial efforts of others.18
Clearly, the second factor in the Howey test, "common enter-
prise,"18 8 does not exist in a bank financing program. This "common
enterprise" may be deemed present if: (1) there is a horizontal pool-
ing of the investor's money,' 8 or (2) if a broker manages the inves-
tor's funds on a discretionary basis.19 Under a bank financing pro-
gram, there is never any pooling of investor funds to purchase
precious metals. Each transaction is handled separately. The investor
controls his or her investment and, therefore, either profits or loses
based upon his or her own decision and not the efforts of another.
Also, neither the broker nor the lender in a bank financing program
normally manage the customer's investment on a discretionary basis.
Consequently, a bank financing program may not properly be consid-
ered an investment contract and should not be regulated as such.
B. Does a Bank Financing Program Constitute a Note or Other
Evidence of Indebtedness?
A bank financing program clearly involves the giving of a prom-
issory note by the individual to the lender as security for the loan. 91
The question thus emerges whether this type of note was intended to
be regulated under the securities laws as an evidence of indebted-
ness. Generally, "the most typical form of notes or evidences of in-
debtedness-promissory notes in return for loans or real estate mort-
gages-almost certainly were not intended to be included within the
definition of a 'security.' "192 Other notes, however, such as those is-
sued by a publicly held corporation for the purpose of raising capital,
were clearly intended to be regulated as securities."9"
Numerous courts have addressed the issue of what constitutes a
187. Id. at 851-54.
188. "The Howey line of cases, although leaving other questions unresolved, has made it
clear that participation in a pooled investment vehicle will raise a presumption of commonality
and expectation of profits based on the efforts of others." Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1624.
189. The horizontal pooling of investors' money is known as "horizontal commonality"
and generally occurs "when an individual deposits a specific sum of money or securities with
the knowledge and expectation that this investment will be pooled with those of similarly situ-
ated investors and that any profits will be shared in a pro-rata basis ... ." Id.
190. This so-called "vertical commonality," that is, "the common enterprise between one
customer and a broker managing the customer's funds on a discretionary basis - is sufficient
to support a finding of an investment contract." Id. at 1625. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497
F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
191. See supra text accompanying note 30.
192. Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1625.
193. See id.
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"note" and "other evidence of indebtedness" under the Securities
Act. Several different tests have emerged. 194 The majority of federal
appellate courts have adopted some form of the commercial/invest-
ment dichotomy test which generally distinguishes notes sold or ac-
quired for "commercial" purposes as opposed to those purchased for
"investment" reasons. 95 Under this test a note is for "investment"
reasons and, therefore, subject to regulation under the securities
laws, if: "(1) the assets acquired in exchange for the notes are of the
character of 'investment assets'; (2) the issuance, purchase, and sale
of notes are made by persons not normally in the business of enter-
ing into the underlying type of transaction; and (3) the note creates
a long-term indebtedness." '96
Several courts have developed variations on the commercial/in-
vestment dichotomy test. The Seventh Circuit's version of this test
employs a motivational approach and focuses on the note purchaser's
or lender's reasons for entering into the transaction.'97 If the pur-
chaser intends for the note to operate as part of a commercial trans-
action, which is entered into for nonspeculative reasons, then the
note probably will not be deemed a security.98 However, if the note
purchaser intends for the note to operate as an investment, it is very
likely the note will be considered a security. 99
In addition to the commercial/investment dichotomy test, sev-
eral minority approaches have developed to determine whether a
common enterprise exists. The "risk capital" test, employed by the
194. See infra notes 195-225 and accompanying text.
195. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1626 (citing SEC v. Diversified Indus., 465 F. Supp.
104 (D.D.C. 1979)). For a general discussion of the status of notes and other evidences of
indebtedness as securities, see Note, The Economic Realities of Defining Notes as Securities
Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 U. FLA. L.
REV. 400 (1982) [hereinafter Note]; Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of "Secur-
ity" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV.
478 (1973); Comment, The Status of the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175.
196. Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1626. See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d
490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d
1109 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Diversified Indus., 465 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1979). As in most
areas of the securities laws, the focus is on the context of the note transaction rather than the
labels applied by the parties. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967). The Supreme
Court in Tcherepnin stated that "in searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security'
in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic
reality." Id. at 336 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946)).
197. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1626. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enter. v. G.& G. Enter., 508
F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463
F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
198. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1626.
199. See id.
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Ninth Circuit,200 focuses on whether the purchaser or lender of the
note has "contributed risk capital subject to the 'entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts' " of others.20 1 Generally, six factors are of impor-
tance under this test: "(1) the time of the note's maturity; (2) the
extent of its collateralizaton; (3) the form of the obligation; (4) the
circumstances of its issuance; (5) the relationship between the
amount borrowed and the size of the borrower's business; and (6)
the expected use of the proceeds. 202
The last test to be examined is that of the Second Circuit,
which follows the literal approach to classifying note transactions as
securities.20 3 This method closely follows the statutory language and
presumes all notes to be securities.' Generally, it has been held
that "any note which has a maturity date exceeding nine months and
is not ordinarily delivered in connection with commercial transac-
tions (consumer financing, notes secured by mortgages on homes,
short-term notes secured by liens on businesses, or assignments of
accounts receivable) is presumed to be a security.
20 5
Under any of the above tests, it is highly unlikely that the note
involved in a bank financing program would be considered a security.
The financed sale of precious metals is no more than a typical com-
mercial or consumer financing transaction in which an individual re-
ceives a loan in order to purchase an underlying good. The lender's
interest in the transaction is purely commercial .20  The lender
merely seeks to facilitate the purchase of a commodity by an individ-
ual. A lender does not enter these programs with an "investment
motive. '20 7 Rather, the loan is made solely for nonspeculative com-
mercial purposes.
These are not loans in which a lender has contributed "risk cap-
ital" subject to the managerial efforts of others. 20 8 The lender only
receives interest and principal payments on the loan and does not
profit or lose if the value of the precious metals rises or falls. The
only interest the lender has in the metals is a security interest to
200. United Cal. Bank v. T.H.C. Fin. Corp., 557 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); Great W.
Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
201. Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976). See also
Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1627.
202. Note, supra note 195, at 415.
203. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2nd Cir.
1976); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
204. Note, supra note 195, at 415.
205. Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1627. See also supra note 203.
206. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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ensure repayment of the loaned amount.2 09
The most definitive statement to date regarding the status of
bank financing programs under the securities laws was in the testi-
mony of John M. Fedders before the Senate Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigations' 1984 hearings on precious metals trading. 10
Mr. Fedders, then the Director of the SEC's Division of Enforce-
ment, testified that financing precious metals transactions would not
necessarily result in the characterization of a commercial transaction
as a security. 1 In fact, Mr. Fedders pointed out that bank financed
precious metal transactions are essentially "no different from fi-
nanced purchases of other commodities, which generally have not
been regarded as involving the sale of securities."2"' Mr. Fedders
stated that
[t]he arranging of financing for precious metals transactions
would not, in most situations, transform the sales into sales of
securities. Actual sales of commodities financed by a bank or the
seller would, absent other factors, have little to distinguish them
from financed sales of houses or automobiles. Such transactions
are financed purchase transactions and not securities. "
Therefore, it is 'doubtful that a bank financing program could prop-
erly be regulated as a security under the federal securities laws.
V. Summary
Although the main thrust of the regulatory investigation into
bank financing programs is focusing on the activity of fraudulent
brokers, " many regulators also believe that "as banks seek to ex-
pand the scope of their operations into new and non-traditional ar-
eas, they should expect the need to comply with laws governing those
new areas, each of which is designed for its own specialized regula-
209. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
210. Fedders' Testimony, supra note 93. Mr. Fedders pointed out that contracts for the
purchase or sale of precious metals should not be considered securities if:
(1) the dealer's functions merely are ministerial, such as providing storage of the
metal; (2) the services that the dealer offers are not part of an "investment pack-
age," by which the customer simply invests money and receives profits or losses;
(3) no "buy-back" plan or other arrangement that gives the dealer shares in the
customer's risk exists; and (4) the dealer provides no investment advice and exer-
cises no investment discretion over the customer's account.
Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1678 (citing Fedders' Testimony, supra note 93, at 201-02).
211. See Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1678.
212. Id. (citing Fedders' Testimony, supra note 93, at 202).
213. Fedders' Testimony, supra note 93, at 202. See also Gilberg, supra note 2, at 1678.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 9, 10, 58.
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tory purposes."12 16 On the other hand, the lenders believe that they
are already sufficiently regulated under existing state and federal
banking laws, and that their participation in these programs does not
raise any issues under the existing commodities or securities laws.
Currently, the law favors the lenders' position. 16 CFTC Interpretive
Letter 85-217 has granted the lenders a "safe-harbor" from the com-
modities laws.218 Bank financing programs have also been deemed
not to raise any serious issues under the existing securities laws.1 0
However, since the CFTC is currently reexamining its position
regarding Interpretive Letter 85-2, the future of bank financing pro-
grams is uncertain. As the foregoing analysis indicates, it is not fea-
sible to regulate these programs as either leverage contracts220 or se-
curities, 2 or to bring them under the regulatory scheme of the
Model State Commodity Code. 22 It is possible, however, that the
CFTC may remove the "safe-harbor" status granted to bank financ-
ing programs by declaring that they are, in essence, futures contracts
and, therefore, should be regulated as such. 2"
Currently it appears that this outcome may be avoided as long
as the lenders are willing to cooperate with federal and state regula-
tors in curbing consumer fraud in these programs. To the lenders,
this is certainly a much more favorable alternative than to submit to
the extensive regulatory requirements of the CFTC.
VI. Proposed Solutions
There are several ways in which lenders involved in bank financ-
ing programs may be able to avoid the unnecessary regulatory juris-
diction of the CFTC while still furthering consumer protection.
Since the fraud present in these programs is perpetrated by fraudu-
lent brokers and not by the lending institutions, having the lenders
submit to the CFTC's extensive regulatory scheme will not com-
pletely prevent the fraudulent practices of the so-called "boiler-room
operators." There are, however, methods, other than CFTC regula-
215. Phillips, Banks Trading in Futures Confront New Regulator, AM. BANKER, Oct.
10, 1983, at 29.
216. See CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985).
217. Id.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 73-90.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 174-213.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 127-49.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 174-213.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 150-73.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 98-126.
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tions, which will more effectively combat the problems facing bank
financing programs.
A. Consumer Awareness
One key to preventing consumer fraud in bank financing pro-
grams is educating the general public concerning the benefits and
risks involved in financing a precious metals purchase. " A potential
way of achieving this goal is to establish industry guidelines that re-
quire all lenders, as well as brokers, involved in these programs to
fully disclose the terms, conditions, risks, and costs to every cus-
tomer.125 "Every effort should be made to inform the investor of all
facts relevant to his potential purchase so that the investor himself
can make an informed decision regarding the suitability of the pro-
posed investment. ' 226
Recently, the Industry Council for Tangible Assets
("ICTA"),'117a 630-member group of precious metal industry lead-
ers, prescribed guidelines for its members, including lenders and bro-
kers. These guidelines emphasize full disclosure to the customer and
are designed to assure direct contact between the customer and the
lender .228 Assuring direct contact between the customer and lender
224. See Norris, supra note 30.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The Industry Council for Tangible Assets ("ICTA") was founded in 1983 by a
group of numismatic and precious metal industry leaders "with the common goal of promoting
and protecting the tangible assets industry." Id. ICTA now has a dues-paying membership of
over 630 precious metals coin and bullion dealers, refiners, brokerage houses, banks and suppli-
ers. ICTA has monitored and participated in a number of ongoing developments which directly
affect the precious metals industry, including adoption of the Model State Commodity Code,
sales tax legislation, postal rates and regulations, and the American Eagle Bullion Coin Pro-
gram. Id.
228. See id. Included in these guidelines are the following provisions:
(1) In the event a retail customer of a precious metals retailer seeks financ-
ing from a lending institution, the lending institution shall promptly send appro-
priate loan documentation directly to such customer. The lending institution
shall require that the retail customer return the loan documentation directly to
the lending institution.
(2) Lending institutions shall not accept referrals from precious metals re-
tailers where the lending institution is aware of facts indicating an intentional or
reckless disregard by the precious metals retailer of the legal rights of the
customers.
(3) Lending institutions shall provide retail customers with a confirmation
of receipt of collateral within a reasonable period of time following the cus-
tomer's purchase. Such confirmation shall fully describe the metals received
[and state if held in a pool or in a segregated manner].
(4) Lending institutions shall maintain the customer's collateral in the exact
form, size, type and quantity as specified by the purchasing documents.
(5) Precious metals retailers will obtain and make available to their retail
customers documentation describing the services offered by the lending institu-
BANK FINANCED METALS TRADING
will help guard against potential fraud by the broker-dealer. 229 These
guidelines, however, "are designed to be used as an internal mecha-
nism and are not an appropriate basis for regulations. 210
B. Lender Screening of Broker-Dealers
At the present time, most lenders involved in bank financing
programs perform only a cursory screening of the broker-dealers
with whom they do business. However, since only a small number of
lenders are involved in these programs, these lenders should lead the
way in establishing uniform criteria under which they will accept
transactions from nonfraudulent broker-dealers. 3 1 The establish-
ment of such criteria by the lenders will not only help improve the
quality of their business but may also help to eliminate the activity
of fraudulent broker-dealers.'
In the past, some regulators believed that the lenders involved in
these programs intentionally knew little about the precious metals
dealers with whom they dealt, in order to insulate themselves from
potential liability through an agency relationship. 3 Therefore, the
promulgation of screening criteria by the lenders should not be con-
strued as dictating to the broker-dealers how they must conduct their
business.' If this were to happen, an agency relationship may be
more readily established. The finding of such an agency relationship
would almost certainly put an end to lender participation in such
innovative programs because lenders do not wish to subject them-
selves to unknown liability for the fraudulent acts of others. This
would be an unfavorable result for all parties, especially for the gen-
eral public that would no longer be afforded the benefits of such fi-
nancing programs.
C. Minimum Financial Requirements for Purchasers
Currently, few lenders do thorough checks on the credit-worthi-
tions to whom they refer customers, as well as ICTA or similar consumer educa-
tional brochures generally describing precious metals financing transactions.





231. See Love, supra note 39, at 5-6.
232. Id. at 6.
233. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 30 (statement of CFTC Commissioner Fowler
West).
234. See Love, supra note 39, at 6.
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ness of the individuals to whom they lend under these programs,"'
because lenders view these programs as collateral lending, rather
than extensions of credit.23 6 Although this view of the lenders suffi-
ciently protects their interests, it does nothing to protect the bor-
rower from becoming over-extended.23 7 Therefore, in order to afford
the general public another layer of protection, lenders should volun-
tarily do more thorough investigations into the financial situations of
prospective borrowers.
This type of "suitability" or "know-your-customer" rules will
not only benefit the borrowers but will also aid the lenders because
"it's just good business" to know your customer.238 At a minimum,
lenders in these programs should review financial statements submit-
ted by the potential borrower and perform credit evaluations and
employment verifications.239 These types of minimum standards will
help to eliminate "the possibility of consumers getting into difficul-
ties or problems because they cannot handle the obligations under
precious metals financing programs."240
D. Audits to Ensure Precious Metal Holdings
The last major concern voiced by regulators-whether or not
actual precious metals are purchased and stored for the con-
sumer 241--can also be adequately addressed without forcing the
lenders involved in these programs to submit to regulation under the
commodities or securities laws. Regulators are concerned that an un-
scrupulous broker or lender may not actually purchase the metal,
but rather cover its obligations by buying futures contracts in-
stead.242 This would amount to speculation with customer funds and
would be an unacceptable practice.2 48 This can be prevented by peri-
odic audits of the lending institutions and their storage facilities by
235. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
236. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
237. See Lawrence Fuchs, Statement Before the Advisory Committee on CFTC-State
Cooperation (Oct. 8, 1987) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office) [hereinafter
Fuchs]. Mr. Fuchs, Deputy Comptroller, Department of Banking & Finance, State of Florida,
stated that banks "should not consider it a safe loan simply because they have collateral, but
[should] take into consideration whether or not that loan is also safe for the person who is
taking it out." Id.
238. See Tom Russo, Statement Before the Advisory Committee on CFTC-State Coop-
eration (Oct. 8, 1987) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office).
239. See Fuchs, supra note 237.
240. See Robert Wilmouth, Statement Before the Advisory Committee on CFTC-State
Cooperation (Oct. 8, 1987) (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
242. See id.
243. See id.
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state and federal banking officials. These audits will ensure that all
of the metals purported to have been sold are actually held by the
lender or designated depository.
VII. Conclusion
The CFTC should not change its position with regard to 85-2244
at this time. Rather, the CFTC should allow the lenders involved in
precious metals financing programs to continue their operations
under this current banking laws and under the solutions proposed in
this Comment. This will allow the industry to operate more effi-
ciently by sparing the lenders from burdensome regulatory require-
ments while, at the same time, providing increased protection for the
general public.
William M. Lafferty
244. CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 85-2, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 22,673 (Aug. 6, 1985).

